A critical commentary on management science in relation to reforms after institutional National Health Service failures by Regan, Paul John & Ball, Elaine
Article
A critical commentary on management science in 
relation to reforms after institutional National Health 
Service failures
Regan, Paul John and Ball, Elaine
Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/16698/
Regan, Paul John and Ball, Elaine (2017) A critical commentary on management science in 
relation to reforms after institutional National Health Service failures. Journal of Nursing 
Management, 25 (2). pp. 149­156. ISSN 0966­0429  
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jonm.12425
For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>.
For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ 
All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including
Copyright law.  Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use 
of this material are defined in the http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/policies/
CLoK
Central Lancashire online Knowledge
www.clok.uclan.ac.uk
 
 
1 
 
A critical commentary on management science in relation to reforms following 
institutional National Health Service failures  
 
Abstract 
Aim(s): A discussion paper on the United Kingdom (UK) National Health Service (NHS) 
market reforms. Background: NHS market reforms reliance on management science 
methods introduced a fundamental shift in measuring care for commissioning purposes 
Evaluation: A number of key reports are discussed in relation to NHS market reforms and 
management science. Key issues; NHS market reforms were influenced through a close 
alliance between policy makers, the department of health, free market think tanks and 
management consultancies. The timing of reforms coincided with reports on NHS failings 
and the evolution of measurement methods to focus on finance. Conclusions: The balance in 
favour of measurement practises is of concern. Management science methods are criticised in 
the Francis report yet promoted as the solution to some of the key findings; why may be 
explained by the close alliance. Implications for Nursing Management: A return to 
principles of management involving consensus, trust, involvement in which a shared vision 
and a can do, hands on approach to management and use management science methods to 
this end.  
 
Aims 
This discussion paper discusses UK NHS market reforms operationalised through 
management science. Separately, NHS market reforms and management science are 
contentious but in combination they appear to coincide with a period of unprecedented NHS 
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failings (Tallis and Davis, 2015; see figure 1). We suggest this is not a coincidence but 
symptomatic of the modus operandi to manage and measure.  
 
Background 
We disclaim the right to scrutinise other countries’ institutional healthcare failings, and 
therefore maintained a local critique; in particular, the key policy documentation responding 
to failures both culturally and institutionally within UK hospitals. To that effect, a literature 
search was undertaken of the documents written by the department of health which are 
deemed policy, and subsequent peer reviewed commentary on those findings. While this 
paper is limited to the UK, it does make significant reference to management science and its 
manifestation globally.  
 
The NHS market reforms and management science started over thirty years ago with the 
Griffiths Management Inquiry in 1983 (DHSS, 1983). The report commissioned by the UK 
government was a root and branch evaluation of the NHS aimed at challenging resistance to 
change, and to modernise the health service (Gorsky, 2013). This led to the NHS moving 
away from consensus management and accepting general management with a clear chain of 
accountability (Fielden, 2015; Gorsky, 2013). The report included a realistic perception of the 
NHS by staff and the public; cost efficiency, evaluation of services, information gathering 
and performance management were recommended (DHSS, 1983). Critics suggested Griffiths 
introduced concepts from industry such as outsourcing, reducing the amount of people 
making and implementing decisions; resulting in the development of a costly administrative 
system to organise external decision making (Gorsky, 2013). Such criticisms were not 
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restricted to the UK as multiple healthcare arenas internationally were driven by similar cost 
administration drives. Griffiths’ report conceded that business in management terms realised 
the NHS was not profit driven and its goals should be seen in the wider social context, which 
could not be measured (DHSS, 1983). Griffiths also suggested the social impact of the NHS 
was overstated and the government of the day was urging a review of the NHS in terms of 
levels of service, performance measured against quality criteria, budgets, cost efficiency and  
productivity (DHSS, 1983). In contrast, United States healthcare was predicated on a 
business model which conflicted, quite radically, with the UK’s post-war provision of free 
healthcare for all. This was the start of the management revolution along United States (US) 
business lines and a weakening of the social context of the NHS (Klein, 2006).  
 
Evaluation 
A precursor to the global financial crisis of 2007/8 was the introduction of a number of policy 
documents. In the UK this took the form of tendering competition and services such as 
Transforming Community Services (TCS, DH, 2009), Equity and Excellence (DH, 2010a) and 
Achieving world class productivity in the NHS 2009/10 2013/14 (DH, 2010b). The documents 
argued strongly for a market solution to funding the NHS and to distance the government 
from its responsibility to ensure a comprehensive healthcare system for UK taxpayers (Tallis 
and Davis, 2013). This distance would be achieved by what Sandel (2009, p. 4) called 
“markets mimicking governance”. Nearly a decade later, there is a speculative NHS where 
movements in financial markets aggregate healthcare expenditure and provision. The Health 
and Social Care Act (2012) brought into sharp focus market liberalisation and a publically 
owned NHS with a shift towards a US model of health care (Tallis and Davis, 2013). The Act 
(2012) was clarified operationally in The National Health Service (Procurement, patient 
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choice and competition) Regulations (2013) to meet the needs of NHS patients, and improve 
quality and efficiency through contracts and competition (part 2, 2, p.2). The NHS has 
therefore evolved to manage the expansion of procurement which is promoted as the solution 
to saving public money, increasing productivity and competition between NHS and non-NHS 
providers by the methods of management science (Krachler and Greer, 2015).  
 
Money saving initiatives are not limited to a country or an economic crisis and even when 
bear and bullish markets and struggling economies level out, cost-saving efficiencies extend 
interminably (Maresso et al., 2015). Indeed, anti-austerity has turned into a global movement 
in which media commonly report thousands of people taking to the streets in countries like 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland to name a few. How much statutory healthcare is being eroded 
by the erratic speculation of earlier market turbulence is disputable. However, European-wide 
case studies on austerity and healthcare by Maresso et al (2015) and the Kings Fund are in no 
doubt of the collision between performance-efficiency and cost-efficiency when financial 
markets go into crisis. Being asked to do more for less and with less is common parlance. The 
“unprecedented slowdown” in the NHS since 2010 has been well documented by the Kings’ 
Fund locally (Appleby 2014). Internationally, Deloitte’s reported in its 2015 Global 
Healthcare Outlook that most world economies face formidable challenges in healthcare 
provision with spending hitting 2%. 10.6% of growth domestic product means that as 
demands rise with population, living longer, early diagnoses, innovations etc, healthcare 
systems worldwide face significant challenges ahead. Yet, with hindsight come the measures, 
and, as empirical as they may be, always seems to include ways to save money; or as the 
discourse might say, to demonstrate values in a competing economic world. 
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Key issues 
We are not arguing against science or an evidence-base, but the balance in favour of 
measurement practises: that in itself is not a science, but an activity and one we examine 
critically as a key issue and cause for concern linked to NHS cultural and institutional 
failings. Management consultancies reports, commissioned by the department of health, are 
discussed alongside the proliferation of management science (whatever that codicil implies). 
 
Management science principles, developed by Frederick Taylor (1856-1915) in the US, refer 
to the analysis of workload through technocratic, procedural practises with the specific aim of 
increasing efficiency and productivity (Gupta and Bennett, 2014). Proponents are taught how 
to measure human action through quantitative methods used as benchmarks to control quality 
and productivity (Caldari, 2007). The Taylorist methods went out of favour in the middle of 
the twentieth century due to the negative effect of work intensification, lowered worker 
moral, the increased ratio of managers to workers and sharper procedural focus (Caldari, 
2007). Management science resurfaced in the mid-twentieth century in Harvard University’s 
Masters in Business Administration (MBA) proposing Neo-Taylorist principles as the 
antidote to organisational problems (Axelson, 1998). Management science methods promote 
decision making based on a scientific repository of information to shape policy (Siedelman, 
2015). However, the quantitative methods were criticised as pseudo-scientific because unless 
individuals are trained in such methods, the process is difficult to question (Caldari, 2007).  
 
The proliferation of management practices 
The quantification of human activity using information to inform business decision making 
has been adopted by international companies such as NASA, IBM, Kellogg’s, BMW, Nokia, 
Samsung, Proctor and Gamble and Ford to name a few (Anderson et al., 2009). US style 
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management science methods are now so prevalent they are applied in a variety of ways 
internationally such as data mining, resource distribution and forecasting, financial logistics, 
quality assurance, networks (inter connected group or system), optimisation (looking for the 
best), project planning and management, queuing, simulation and experimentation (Anderson 
et al., 2009); in other words, an array of management-science-information to advise business 
decision making has proliferated. Management science methods are also attractive to 
politicians. For example, the UK department of health utilised McKinsey and company (DH, 
2010b) to review NHS commissioning. The same company was commissioned to review 
Northern Ireland social work education in 2004 (DHSSPS, 2004); the general management 
that Griffiths reasonably suggested had evolved to influence national policy and 
organisational discourse. Whether or not companies such as this are inside or outside an 
organisation is debatable; it is sometimes difficult to say if commissioned bodies are external 
and employed to improve productivity or function or simply come in to stream-line a 
business and then leave. Either way, external influences are often viewed with suspicion and 
much has been written in recent years about adapting companies to fit with market conditions 
at the exclusion of tradition or company philosophy. Lean management is a way of enhancing 
while also preserving company values. Influence from outside is regarded by lean 
management as “waste” as employees within the organisation are more than capable of 
identifying issues to both locate and improve functionality if invited.  
 
Despite a plethora of organisational theories since Taylor, as a discussion paper, we use the 
term “management science” to refer to the adoption of neo-Taylorist quantification methods 
promoting organisational efficiency and labour productivity (Axelson, 1998; Gupta and 
Bennett, 2014). Proponents range from external companies with little or no experience in the 
sector they manage or a hybridisation of experienced practitioners managing clinical areas 
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using management science methods (Fulop 2012). Management science was extended in the 
NHS to manage productivity and market reforms and the collaboration of NHS market 
reforms and management science created systems to manage functionality through standards, 
benchmarks, guidelines and decision models with criticism of the effectiveness of 
measurement based assessment effectiveness (Beaussier et al, 2015). The tendency to create 
systems promotes the myth of productivity – doing more work with less staff – and 
dependency on procedural systems (Appleby et al., 2015). Performance indicators identified 
in policy-led management inevitably reduce local decision making based on local data 
(Appleby et al, 2015) and promote a dependency on risk based models rather than 
practitioner autonomy (Beaussier et al, 2015). As lean management espouses, this rules out 
potential that could be tapped into within an organisation from employees who deal with 
functional issues, snags and bottlenecks on a daily basis. This type of tension is described as 
“muda” by lean management (or waste). By encapsulating many of the principles of lean 
management, employees within an organisation are not legitimised by proponents from 
outside an organisation; rather their motivation, potential and investment in the organisation 
is stymied. 
 
In contrast to lean management, management science promotes a breed of technocrats in 
organisations to increase bureaucratic control. They are people not trained to provide 
healthcare and are management consultants, risk managers and accountants who bring with 
them new tiers of obstruction (Hopper and Hopper, 2009). Moreover, despite healthcare 
institutions employing their own clinicians to become managers, there is evidence they 
become de-skilled when balancing the need to be change agents, diplomatic administrators 
and entrepreneurs while attempting to meet government policy-led targets (Gatenby et al., 
2015). For many, the restrictions of policy-led management stifle their judgement to manage 
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local issues flexibly and they may purposefully resist strategic objectives (Gatenby et al, 
2014).  
 
Management consultancy and the McKinsey report 
Management science practise is a blunt instrument incentivised by its own intrinsic design to 
measure, data crunch and cut to the bone (Hopper and Hopper, 2009). While this is vigorous 
statement, examples can be found in reports with questionable meta-narratives where 
management science dictates rather than proposes (which is not the basis of science as an 
endeavour or discipline). One example is the aforementioned McKinsey report (DH, 2010b) 
which was a feasibility study for the department of health on how commissioners could 
increase productivity in the NHS. Notably McKinsey is a US consultancy giant with at least 
ninety clients in Fortune magazine’s top one hundred corporations and perhaps an unlikely 
choice considering the pick of unbiased academic analysis available (Tallis and Davis, 2015). 
However, the report identified outcomes based on current predictions to “calculate current 
spend assuming that productivity improvements identified … have been achieved” (DH, 
2010b): an example surely of data fitting an agenda proposed as a possible solution (Tallis 
and Davis, 2013). If we are to assume that the recommendations of the McKinsey report were 
acted upon, might explain how a system can be purposefully designed to be in a permanent 
state of tension, not harmony, as seen in the various reports of NHS failures with the solution 
already identified to promote more measurement and market liberalisation (Berwick, 2013; 
Cloward-Piven, 1966).  
 
The McKinsey report (DH, 2010b) identified a close working relationship between UK policy 
makers at the department of health and influential US management consultancies, think tanks 
and regulatory bodies (Tallis and Davis, 2013). For example, the then head of strategy for the 
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department of health became a partner at McKinsey and was instrumental in the two “Darzi” 
reports; a former McKinsey partner was later in an influential position in Monitor, the 
hospital regulators, the Nuffield Trust and The Kings Fund (Tallis and Davis, 2013, p. 60). 
We mention the close working relationship between commissioned consultancies and the 
possibility of vested interest of both parties agenda. One example of the agenda behind the 
McKinsey report (DH, 2010b) was to suggest reducing mandatory staffing levels which had 
been considered important to maintain the protection of the public. However, it also served to 
overcome what McKinsey referred to as resistance and “pain” to the workforce of market 
reforms (DH, 2010b, p. 84).  
 
The Munro report 
We could argue that no one – be they employee or patient, adult or child – is immune. In the 
UK the Munro review of child protection (DfE, 2011) commissioned by the secretary of State 
for Education asked the question “what helps professionals make the best judgments they can 
to protect a vulnerable child?” In short, previous versions of the report had identified that the 
child protection system had become “…over over-bureaucratised and focused on compliance 
to one that values and develops professional expertise…” (p. 6). This was due to the 
emphasis on performance indicators which provided a small part of the overall picture to 
reinforce “process” over effective help and support given to children (DfE, 2011). The 
development of an overtly defensive system of prescriptive procedures and recording systems 
for health visitors was found to obstruct decision making ability and services developing 
support and expertise to work effectively with children and families (DfE, 2009, p. 6). Instead 
of “doing things right” the service should instead “do the right thing” to check children and 
families were being helped. In short, the system should value professional expertise for the 
benefit of the child and family rather than stifle timely decision making (DfE, 2011). 
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Performance indicators and targets are therefore clearly flawed methods of control yet remain 
the modus operandi for policy-led management science (DfE, 2011). With this conclusion in 
mind we now discuss another report which made similar observations but with different 
conclusions, the Francis report.  
 
In the UK in the wake of the 2013 Mid Staffordshire inquiry (commonly referred to as the 
Francis report) and the two hundred and ninety recommendations, the government 
announced a number of patient safety initiatives with fifteen locally led collaborative groups 
covering the geography of England with the aim of making the NHS the safest healthcare 
system in the world (Berwick, 2013). Berwick’s report entitled A promise to learn (2013) 
suggested it “…is the systems, procedures, conditions, environment and constraints they face 
that lead to patient safety problems…” Therefore, according to the report, staff in the NHS 
were considered blameless to a large extent, in the majority of cases, and in order to learn 
from the mistakes he suggested the NHS should be a learning organisation (p.4). Berwick 
suggests patients should come first and the “…quantitative targets should be used with 
caution. Such goals do have an important role en route to progress, but should never 
displace the primary goal of better care…transparency…” (Berwick, 2013, p. 4). However, 
there is little or no criticism of NHS market reforms and the business culture that led to an 
attitudinal change leading to neglect. Notably, in the Francis report staff and patients’ 
complaints were ignored as were the statistics indicating high mortality rates in comparison 
to others in England (Berwick, 2013: Beaussier et al 2015). Berwick’s recommendations, 
however, suggest the mastery of quality and patient safety science, continual improvement, 
supported change and supervisory/ regulatory systems be made simpler to avoid diffusion of 
responsibility (Berwick, 2013). Berwick also suggested a need for transparency, data sharing 
 
 
11 
 
in a timely fashion, patients and their carers having a voice, an appropriate number of staff 
and learning from mistakes. The report also suggests: 
 
“commissioners, regulators and providers of training and education for healthcare 
professionals … should ensure that all healthcare professionals receive … education 
on the principles and practices of patient safety, on measurement of quality and patient 
safety, and on skills for engaging patients actively” (p. 26).  
 
What is noticeable is that Berwick’s (2013) suggestions to improve measurement skills across 
the board, from chief executive to staff, were adapted from the US healthcare conglomerate 
Kaiser Permanente (KPMG). The recommendations go further to state most providers do not 
have the capacity to analyse, monitor, or learn from safety and quality information (Berwick, 
2013).  
 
Hence, rather than be critical of a quantitative measurement culture, Berwick actually is 
promoting the expansion of data management even further (Berwick, 2013). Berwick’s 
conclusions are contradicted by Beaussier et al’s (2015, p.2) research into the value of 
measurement based approaches, in relation to the rise of quantification methods in the NHS, 
and its aim to regulate, improve clinical effectiveness and proportionality of decision making. 
Through “better regulation,” standard setting, gathering of information, management science 
aims to effectively ensure a risk approach to probability and consequences through 
measurable outcome based assessment (Demeritt et al., 2015). However, criticism of 
measurement outcomes are their timeliness, interpretation, variety of indicators, tolerance for 
error and political choice in relation to target setting. For example, there is a tendency to 
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identify targets that have public appeal in relation to high mortality (Demeritt et al, 2007). 
Beaussier et al (2015) concludes that measurement based assessment have failed to improve 
the quality of the NHS service provision because of the lack of consensus about what quality 
of care actually means and how it can be achieved against the mantra of productivity and 
efficiency.  
 
The further development of measurement practice is of concern because it indicates a 
confidence in practises which are significant factors in reports on the failing of the NHS (DH, 
2012), see figure 1 below, such as the parliamentary ombudsman report entitled Care and 
compassion (2011) and The Morecambe bay investigation (2015), symptomatic in part 
because of their timing in relation to NHS market reforms and the expansion of management 
science within the NHS since 2010 (Holme, 2015).  
 
Figure 1: Reports, timings and conclusions 
Reports Timings Conclusions 
The Parliamentary 
and Health Service 
Ombudsman Care 
and Compassion 
(2011) 
2009-2010 Ten cases involving elderly people affected by poor 
communication, poor discharge planning, indifference, 
neglect of basic needs, people left in soiled clothing/ 
bedding, unwashed, unfed, thirsty, wishes were ignored, 
lack of compassion. The report identifies institutional 
attitudes, a failure to respond with compassion and 
professionalism 
The Mid 
Staffordshire 
inquiry (2013) 
2005-2008  A harmful cult of management since 2001 obsessed with 
ill-considered targets, a culture of bullying and harassment 
preventing staff from raising clinical concerns, a culture of 
collusion and a failure to ensure essential care to patients 
The Morecambe 
Bay Investigation 
(2015) 
2004-2013 A major factor affecting clinical failings and high 
neonatal, maternal mortality rates was a need to save £24 
million from the Trusts budget (p.59) 
 
The government’s response to the Francis report’s two hundred and ninety recommendations 
is thorough, costly and comprehensive (DH 2015) but then again such reports may not have 
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been warranted if such cultural shifts and commissioning reforms had been more moderate. 
This assertion is made in the knowledge that since its inception in 1948, apart from NHS 
reports from the late sixties (Cochrane, 1990; Robb, 1967), the main point is that at no time in 
the history of the NHS have so many reports occurred in such a short time (Holme, 2015). 
This leads to a tentative conclusion that management science has impacted on the NHS and a 
degree of caution is required if suggesting it is part of the solution to Berwick (2013) and 
NHS England’s (2015) responses to the Francis inquiry. 
 
Future proofing a learning organisation 
The NHS England (2013) and Berwick’s (2013) recommendations to empower staff, ensure 
transparency and increase measurement of action using data systems appears to be at odds 
with the need for professionals to use their judgement unobstructed by systems management. 
These inconsistencies mean findings identifying what can be learnt do not take into 
consideration the wider context, such as why there are reports of failings in the NHS now 
more than at any other point in the history of the NHS and what are the significant factors 
(Holme, 2015).  
 
A return to common sense and a shared vision 
We now discuss the implications for nursing management through Hopper and Hopper’s 
(2009) antidote to the proliferation of management science methods and its attitudes. Hopper 
and Hopper (2009) suggest an antidote to management science would be to let expert 
healthcare practitioners be empowered to make the necessary changes in clinical practice 
based on their motivation for personal responsibility, expertise and autonomy. Hopper and 
Hopper (2009) suggest a return to principles of management that involve consensus, trust, 
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great teamwork, a clear leadership and having a shared vision. They referred these principles 
to the Puritan values of the US founding fathers. Trusting practitioner to be responsible for 
their actions was a finding in the Munro report (DfE, 2011), Berwick (2013) and NHS 
England (2013). Hopper and Hopper (2009) identified that innovation with a “hands on” and 
“can do” workforce “leading from the front” are the possible solution to the disconnect 
between the collection of data and its application. Then change can be local, achievable and 
above all not policy-led. Critically for nurse managers, Hopper and Hopper (2009) suggest 
that sustainable innovation starts with and should be implemented by the same expert people 
who then evaluate its effect. This approach led them to quote Cameron (1963), often 
attributed to Einstein because it was a sign hanging on his office door at Princeton University, 
that “…not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can be 
counted…” (Cameron, 1963, p. 13). The antithesis of this is manifested in the McKinsey 
report (DH, 201b, p.111) and a cost effective conclusion to “…stop/reduce procedures with 
no/limited clinical benefit….” Hence, the moral impact of management science who decide 
what is of clinical benefit. The nurse manager is instrumental at ward level in correcting such 
attitudes by valuing and promoting the qualitative aspects of care. 
 
Not everything that counts can be counted  
Related to the Francis report and Berwick (2013) is the Druckerian (1993) idea that “… you 
can’t measure what you can’t manage...” and, by extension, proponents of such a system may 
come to think “…if it can’t be measured it doesn’t exist…” (Hopper and Hopper, 2009, p. 
133). Hence, the focus on quantifying human action inevitably leads to dehumanised 
inaction, as seen in the findings of the Francis report. The moral premise underlying the 
notion “not everything that counts can be counted” is a sense of generosity and common 
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purpose, putting patients first and a share of social goods such as education, the law, 
healthcare and a stable society (Ricoeur, 2000). Griffiths appeared to accept this to a certain 
extent (DHSS, 1983). These are the social bonds that tie the rights of the individual through 
the collective power of citizens (Ricoeur, 2000) and Tallis and Davis (2013, p. 9) quote Lord 
David Owen in capturing the spirit of the NHS as a: “…a vocational service. It needs to 
retain in it a generosity of purpose, philosophical commitment and a one-to-one relationship 
with the individual patient…” Many still believe these principles to be true and an NHS 
funded through public taxation should be solely for the benefit of society, not balancing the 
books, meeting targets and shareholder dividends (Tallis and Davis, 20015). We suggest 
therefore in this paper that this narrative has become over powering in the NHS through 
management science operationalising NHS market reforms based on profit and a lack of 
generosity. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has discussed market reforms operationalised through management science. The 
Health and Social Care Act (2012) was the culmination of a thirty-year agenda to promote 
NHS market reforms and liberalise it through competition. We are critical of management 
science which is a blunt instrument if wielded without common sense and knowledge of the 
clinical context. The tendency of management science to control elements of clinical practice, 
such as decision making was discussed in the corrective findings of the Munro report (DH, 
2011). The effect on healthcare coincided with reports on unprecedented failings within the 
NHS (see figure 1) and measurement being promoted as the reason and solution. Counting 
only what can be counted for commissioning purposes, expunges what really counts which is 
care and professional decision making unobstructed by aggregated measurement. Therefore, 
our observation is universal in terms of prioritising patient care where workers and their 
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managers are given the capacity to seek resolutions, within their own healthcare arena, as 
problems occur rather than retrospectively as measurement outcomes.    
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